Abstract. In the problem of reliable multiparty computation (RC), there are n parties, each with an individual input, and the parties want to jointly compute a function f over n inputs. The problem is complicated by the fact that an omniscient adversary controls a hidden fraction of the parties. We describe a self-healing algorithm for this problem. In particular, for a fixed function f , with n parties and m gates, we describe how to perform RC repeatedly as the inputs to f change. Our algorithm maintains the following properties, even when an adversary controls up to t ≤ ( 1 4 − )n parties, for any constant > 0. First, our algorithm performs each reliable computation with the following amortized resource costs: O(m + n log n) messages, O(m + n log n) computational operations, and O( ) latency, where is the depth of the circuit that computes f . Second, the expected total number of corruptions is O(t(log * m) 2 ), after which the adversarially controlled parties are effectively quarantined so that they cause no more corruptions.
Introduction
How can we protect a network against adversarial attack? A traditional approach provides robustness through redundant components. If one component is attacked, the remaining components maintain functionality. Unfortunately, this approach incurs significant resource cost, even when the network is not under attack.
An alternative approach is self-healing, where a network automatically recovers from attacks. Self-healing algorithms expend additional resources only when it is necessary to repair from attacks.
In this paper, we describe self-healing algorithms for the problem of reliable multiparty computation (RC). In the RC problem, there are n parties, each with an individual input, and the parties want to jointly compute a function f over n inputs. A hidden 1/4-fraction of the parties are controlled by an omniscient Byzantine adversary. A party that is controlled by the adversary is said to be bad, and the remaining parties are said to be good. Our goal is to ensure that all good parties learn the output of f . 1 RC abstracts many problems that may occur in high-performance computing, sensor networks, and peer-to-peer networks. For example, we can use RC to enable performance profiling and system monitoring, compute order statistics, and enable public voting.
Our main result is an algorithm for RC that 1) is asymptotically optimal in terms of total messages and total computational operations; and 2) limits the expected total number of corruptions. Ideally, each bad party would cause O(1) corruptions; in our algorithm, each bad party causes an expected O((log * m) 2 ) corruptions.
Our Model
We assume a static Byzantine adversary that takes over t ≤ ( 1 4 − )n parties before the algorithm begins, for any constant > 0. As mentioned previously, parties that are compromised by the adversary are called bad, and the remaining parties are good. The bad parties may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol, by sending no messages, excessive numbers of messages, incorrect messages, or any combination of these. The good parties follow the protocol. We assume that the adversary knows our protocol, but is unaware of the random bits of the good nodes. We make use of a public key cryptography scheme, and thus assume that the adversary is computationally bounded.
We assume a partially synchronous communication model. Any message sent from one good node to another good node requires at most h time steps to be sent and received, and the value h is known to all nodes. However, we allow the adversary to be rushing: the bad nodes receive all messages from good nodes in a round before sending out their own messages. We further assume that each party has a unique ID. We say that party p has a link to party q if p knows q's ID and can thus directly communicate with node q.
In the reliable multiparty computation problem, we assume that the function f can be implemented with an arithmetic circuit over m gates, where each gate has two inputs and at most two outputs. 2 For simplicity of presentation, we focus on computing a single function multiple times (with changing inputs). However, we can also compute multiple functions with our algorithm.
Our Result
We describe an algorithm, COMPUTE, to efficiently solve reliable multiparty computation. Our main result is summarized in the following theorem. Theorem 1. Assume we have n parties providing inputs to a function f that can be computed by an arithmetic circuit with depth and containing m gates. Then COMPUTE solves RC and has the following properties.
-In an amortized sense, 3 any execution of COMPUTE requires the following expected costs: • O(m + n log n) messages sent by all parties, • O(m + n log n) computational operations performed by all parties, and • O( ) latency. -The expected total number of times COMPUTE returns a corrupted output is O(t(log * m) 2 ).
Technical Overview
Our algorithms make critical use of quorums and a quorum graph.
Quorums and the Quorum Graph: We define a quorum to be a set of Θ(log n) parties, of which at most 1/4-fraction are bad. Many results show how to create and maintain a network of quorums [6, 11, 18, 23, 7, 1, 14] . All of these results maintain what we will call a quorum graph in which each vertex represents a quorum. The properties of the quorum graph are: 1) each party is in Θ(log n) quorums; 2) for any quorum Q, any party in Q can communicate directly to any other party in Q; and 3) for any quorums Q and Q that are connected in the quorum graph, any party in Q can communicate directly with any party in Q and vice versa. Moreover, we assume that for any two parties x and y in a quorum, x knows all quorums that y is in. Computing with Quorums: We maintain a quorum graph with m + n nodes: m nodes for the gates of the circuit and n nodes for the inputs of the parties. The input nodes are connected to the gates using these inputs, and the gate nodes are connected as in the circuit. Quorums are mapped to nodes in this quorum graph as described above. See Figure 1 . Intuitively, the computation is performed from the left to the right, where the input quorums are the leftmost quorums and the output quorum is the rightmost one. A correct but inefficient way to solve RC is as follows. Each party s i sends its input to all parties of the appropriate input quorum. Then the computation is performed from left to right. All parties in each quorum compute the appropriate gate operation on their inputs, and send their outputs to all parties in the right neighboring quorums via all-to-all communication. At the next level, all parties in each quorum take the majority of the received messages in order to determine the correct input for their gate. At the end, the parties in the rightmost quorum will compute the correct output of the circuit. They then forward this output back from right to left through the quorum graph using the same all-to-all communication and majority filtering.
Unfortunately, this naive algorithm requires O(m log 2 n) messages and O(m log n) computational operations. Our main goal is to remove the logarithmic factors. 4 Leaders and the CHECK Algorithm: A more efficient approach is for each quorum to have a leader, and for this leader to receive inputs, perform gate computations, and send off the output. Unfortunately, a single bad leader can corrupt the entire computation.
To address this issue, we create CHECK (Section 2.3). This algorithm determines if there has been a corruption, and if so, returns at least one pair of parties that are in conflict. Informally, we say that a pair of parties are in conflict if they each accuse the other of malicious behavior. In such a situation, we know that at least one party in the pair is bad. Our approach is to mark both parties in each conflicting pair, and then to forbid any marked party from being a leader of a quorum. 5 The basic idea of CHECK is to have multiple rounds where in each round, a new party is selected independently at random from each quorum. We call these parties the checkers. For convenience of presentation, we will refer to the leaders as the checkers for round 0. For each round i ≥ 1, all i checkers at gate g: 1) receive inputs to g from all i checkers at input gates for g; 2) compute the gate 4 We note that such asymptotic improvements can be significant for large networks. For example, if n = 64,000, then we would expect our algorithm to reduce message costs by a factor of log 2 n = 255. 5 A technical point is that we may need to unmark all parties in a quorum if too many parties in that quorum become marked. However, a potential function argument (Lemma 5) shows that it is still the case that after O(t) markings, all bad parties will be marked.
output for g based on these inputs; and 3) send this output to all i checkers at each output gate for g. If a checker ever receives inconsistent inputs, it calls UPDATE (Section 2.4), which will return at least one pair of parties that are in conflict. Unfortunately, waiting until a round where each gate has had at least one good checker would require O(log n) rounds.
To do better, we use the following approach. Let G be the quorum graph as defined above and let the checkers be selected as above. Call a subgraph of G bad in a given round if all checkers in the nodes of that subgraph are bad in that round. Any corruption in the first round must occur in a bad subgraph. Moreover, for i rounds of CHECK to fail to find a corruption, there must be nesting levels of bad subgraphs in G in each of those i rounds.
When CHECK elects a good checker at a quorum, it is as if it is removing the node associated with the quorum from the quorum graph. Thus, we can view CHECK as repeatedly removing nodes from increasingly smaller subgraphs of G until no nodes remain, at which the corruption is detected. A key lemma (Lemma 1) shows that for any directed acyclic graph (DAG) with m nodes and maximum degree 4, when each node is deleted with probability 3/4, the probability that a connected subgraph of size Ω(log m) survives is at most 1/2. Using this lemma, we can show that CHECK requires only O(log * m) rounds to detect a corruption with constant probability. 6 Since CHECK requires O((m + n log n)(log * m) 2 ) messages, we can call it with probability 1/(log * m) 2 and obtain asymptotically optimal resource costs for the RC problem, while incurring an expected O(t(log * m) 2 ) corruptions.
Related Work
Our results are inspired by recent work on self-healing algorithms. Early work of [8, 12, 17, 24, 25] discusses different restoration mechanisms to preserve network performance by adding capacity and rerouting traffic streams in the presence of node or link failures. This work presents mathematical models to determine global optimal restoration paths, and provides methods for capacity optimization of path-restorable networks. More recent work [4, 22, 10, 9, 19, 5] considers models where the following process repeats indefinitely: an adversary deletes some nodes in the network, and the algorithm adds edges. The algorithm is constrained to never increase the degree of any node by more than a logarithmic factor from its original degree. In this model, researchers have presented algorithms that ensure the following properties: the network stays connected and the diameter does not increase by much [4, 22, 10] ; the shortest path between any pair of nodes does not increase by much [9] ; expansion properties of the network are approximately preserved [19] ; and keeping network backbones densely connected [5] .
This paper particularly builds on [16] . That paper describes self-healing algorithms that provide reliable communication, with a minimum of corruptions, even when a Byzantine adversary can take over a constant fraction of the nodes in a network. While our attack model is similar to [16] , reliable computation is more challenging than reliable communication, and hence this paper requires a significantly different technical approach. Additionally, we improve the fraction of bad parties that can be tolerated from 1/8 to 1/4.
Reliable multiparty computation (RC) is closely related to the problem of secure multiparty computation (MPC) which has been studied extensively for several decades (see e.g. [26, 2, 3, 21] or the recent book [20] ). RC is simpler than MPC in that it does not require inputs of the parties to remain private. Our algorithm for RC is significantly more efficient than current algorithms for MPC, which require at least polylogarithmic blowup in communication and computational costs in order to tolerate a Byzantine adversary. We reduce these costs through our self-healing approach, which expends additional resources only when corruptions occur, and is able to "quarantine" bad parties after O(t(log * m) 2 ) corruptions.
Organization of Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our algorithms. The analysis of our algorithms is shown in Section 3. Finally, we conclude and describe problems for future work in Section 4.
Our Algorithms
In this section, we describe our algorithms: COMPUTE, COMPUTE-CIRCUIT, CHECK and UP-DATE.
Our algorithms aim at detecting corruptions and marking the bad parties. Parties that are marked are not allowed to participate in the computation process. Initially, all parties are unmarked.
Recall that there are n parties, each provides an input to an input quorum, Q i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n; and then the computation is performed through m quorums Q j , for n + 1 ≤ j ≤ m + n. The result is produced at an output quorum Q m+n .
Before discussing our main COMPUTE algorithm, we describe that when a party x broadcasts a message msg, signed by a quorum Q, to a set of parties S, it calls BROADCAST (msg, Q, S).
BROADCAST
In BROADCAST (Algorithm 1), we use threshold cryptography to avoid the overhead of Byzantine Agreement. In a (η, η )-threshold cryptographic scheme, a private key is distributed among η parties in such a way that 1) any subset of more than η parties can jointly reassemble the key; and 2) no subset of at most η parties can recover the key. The private key can be distributed using a Distributed Key Generation (DKG) protocol [13] . DKG generates the public/private key shares of all parties in every quorum. The public key of each quorum is known to all parties in the quorum, and to all parties in all neighboring quorums in the circuit.
Algorithm 1 BROADCAST(msg, Q, S)
A party x calls this procedure in order to send a message msg, signed by quorum Q, to a set of parties S.
1: Party x sends message msg to all parties in Q. 2: Each party in Q signs msg by its private key share to obtain its message share. 3: Each party in Q sends its message share back to party x. 4: Party x interpolates at least 3|Q| 4 message shares to obtain a signed-message of Q. 5: Party x sends this signed-message to all parties in S.
In particular, we use a (|Q|, 3|Q| 4 − 1)-threshold scheme, where |Q| is the quorum size. A party x calls BROADCAST in order to send a message msg to all parties in S so that: 1) at least 3/4-fraction of the parties in quorum Q have received the same message msg; 2) they agree upon the content of msg; and 3) they give a permission to x to broadcast this message.
Any call to BROADCAST has O(log n + |S|) messages, O(log n) computational operations for signing the message msg by O(log n) parties in Q and O(1) latency.
COMPUTE
Now we describe our main algorithm, COMPUTE (Algorithm 2), which calls COMPUTE-CIRCUIT (Algorithm 3). In COMPUTE-CIRCUIT, the n parties broadcast their inputs to the input quorums. The input quorums forward these inputs to a circuit of m leaders in order to perform the computation and provide the result to the output quorum. Then this result is sent through the same circuit of leaders back to all parties. Recall that a leader of a quorum, is a party in this quorum, that is: 1) a representative of all parties in the quorum; and 2) it is known to all parties in the quorum and neighboring quorums. We assume that all parties provide their inputs to the circuit in the same round.
Algorithm 2 COMPUTE performs a reliable computation and sends the result reliably to all parties.
1: COMPUTE-CIRCUIT computes and sends back the result through a circuit of leaders.
2: TRIGGER-CHECK
The output quorum triggers CHECK with probability 1/(log * m) 2 .
In the presence of an adversary, COMPUTE-CIRCUIT is vulnerable to corruptions. Thus, COM-PUTE calls TRIGGER-CHECK (Algorithm 4), in which the parties of the output quorum decide together, to trigger CHECK (Algorithm 5) with probability 1/(log * m) 2 , using secure multiparty computation (MPC) [21] . CHECK is triggered in order to detect if a computation was corrupted in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT, with probability at least 1/2.
Algorithm 3 COMPUTE-CIRCUIT
performs a computation through a circuit of leaders producing a result at the output quorum; and it sends back result through same circuit to all parties.
1: for i = 1, . . . , n do provides the inputs to the circuit 2:
Party si broadcasts its input ai to all parties in quorum Qi.
3:
All parties in Qi send ai to the leaders of the right neighboring quorums of Qi. 4: end for 5: for i = n + 1, . . . , m + n − 1 do performs the computation. 6: for all j : i < j ≤ m + n and (Qi, Qj) ∈ Circuit do 7:
if leader qi ∈ Qi receives all its inputs then 8:
qi performs an operation on its inputs producing an output, bi.
9:
qi sends bi to leader qj ∈ Qj. 10:
end if 11:
end for 12: end for 13: if leader qm+n ∈ Qm+n receives all its inputs then produces and broadcasts result to output quorum. 14:
qm+n performs an operation on its inputs producing an output, bm+n.
15:
qm+n broadcasts bm+n to all parties in Qm+n. 16: end if 17: for i = m + n, . . . , n + 2 do sends back the result to the leftmost leaders.
18:
for all j : n + 1 ≤ j < i and (Qj, Qi) ∈ Circuit do 19:
Leader qi ∈ Qi sends bm+n to leader qj ∈ Qj. 20: end for 21: end for 22: for i = 1, . . . , n do sends result to all parties after broadcasting it to the input quorums.
23:
The leaders of the right neighboring quorums of Qi broadcast bm+n to all parties in Qi.
24:
All parties in Qi send bm+n to sender si.
25: end for
Unfortunately, while CHECK can determine if a corruption occurred, it does not specify the location where the corruption occurred. Thus, if CHECK detects a corruption, UPDATE (Algorithm 10) is called. When UPDATE is called, it identifies two neighboring quorums Q and Q in the circuit, Algorithm 4 TRIGGER-CHECK The parties of the output quorum Q m+n trigger CHECK with probability 1/(log * m) 2 .
1: Each party in Qm+n chooses an input: a real number uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. 2: The parties of Qm+n perform MPC to find the output, prob, which is the sum of all their inputs divided by |Qm+n|.
CHECK 5: end if such that at least one pair of parties in these quorums is in conflict and at least one party in this pair is bad. Then quorums Q and Q mark these parties and notify all other quorums that these parties are in. All quorums in which these parties are notify their neighboring quorums. For each pair of leaders that is in conflict, their quorums elect a new pair of unmarked leaders uniformly at random. If (1/2 − γ)-fraction of parties in any quorum have been marked, for any constant γ > 0, e.g., γ = 0.01, they are set unmarked in all their quorums and neighboring quorums.
Moreover, we use BROADCAST in COMPUTE-CIRCUIT and CHECK in order to handle any accusation issued in UPDATE against the parties that provide the inputs to the input quorums, or those that receive the result in the output quorum.
Our model does not directly consider concurrency. In a real system, concurrent executions of COMPUTE that overlap at a single quorum may allow the adversary to achieve multiple corruptions at the cost of a single marked bad party. However, this does not effect correctness, and, in practice, this issue can be avoided by serializing concurrent executions of COMPUTE. For simplicity of presentation, we leave the concurrency aspect out of this paper.
CHECK
In this section, we describe CHECK algorithm, which is stated formally as Algorithm 5. In this algorithm, we make use of subquorums, where a subquorum is a subset of unmarked parties in a quorum. Let U k be the set of all unmarked parties in quorum Q k , for 1 ≤ k ≤ m + n.
Algorithm 5 CHECK
Party r calls CHECK to check for corruptions. ELECT(Qm+n) elects a party r ∈ Qm+n.
4:
Party r constructs R1, R2 and R3 to be three m by m arrays of random numbers, where m is the maximum size of any quorum. Note that
REQUEST(R1, R2, i) r requests all senders to recompute. 6: RECOMPUTE(R2, i, r) recomputes producing the result, bm+n, at r.
7:
RESEND-RESULT(R3, bm+n, i) r sends back bm+n to all parties. 8: end for Note that: for each algorithm that is called in CHECK, if any party has previously received a message, it verifies this message with all subsequent messages; also if a party receives inconsistent messages or fails to receive an expected message, then it initiates a call to UPDATE.
CHECK runs for O(log * m) rounds. For each round i, the parties of the output quorum Q m+n elect an unmarked party r from Q m+n to be in charge of the recomputation in round i. This election
Algorithm 6 ELECT(Q)
Parties in Q elect an unmarked party in Q using MPC.
1: Let each party in the set of unmarked parties, U ⊂ Q, is assigned a unique integer from 1 to |U |. 2: Each party in Q chooses an input: an integer uniformly distributed between 1 and |U |.
3: The parties of Q perform MPC to find the output: the sum of all their inputs modulo |U |.
4:
The party in U associated with this output number is the elected party.
process is stated formally in ELECT (Algorithm 6). The elected party r calls REQUEST (Algorithm 7) to send a request through a DAG of subquorums, S for all k : n + 1 ≤ k < j and (Q k , Qj) ∈ Circuit do 7:
All i parties in S
The parties in S Party q k sends REQ to all the parties in S 1 k . 10:
end for 11: end for 12: for k ← n, . . . , 1 do Input quorums forward REQ to all senders.
13:
All i parties in the right neighboring subquorums of Q k broadcast REQ to all parties in Q k . 14:
All parties in Q k send REQ to sender s k .
15: end for
Moreover, in ELECT (Q), the parties of quorum Q use MPC to elect an unmarked party uniformly at random from Q. Note that at any moment at least half of the unmarked parties in Q are good, thus the elected party is good with probability at least 1/2. Finally, this election protocol runs in O(1) time, and requires O(log 2 n) messages and O(log n) computational operations.
During CHECK, if any party receives inconsistent messages or fails to receive and verify any expected message in any round, it initiates a call to UPDATE.
UPDATE
When a computation is corrupted and CHECK detects this corruption, UPDATE is called. The UP-DATE algorithm is described formally as Algorithm 10. When UPDATE starts, all parties in each quorum in the circuit are notified.
The main purpose of UPDATE is to 1) determine the location in which the corruption occurred; and 2) mark the parties that are in conflict.
To determine the location in which the corruption occurred, UPDATE calls INVESTIGATE (Algorithm 11) to investigate the current situation by letting each party involved in COMPUTE-
Algorithm 8 RECOMPUTE(R, i, r)
The n senders provide inputs to a DAG of subquorums, S 2 j 's, for n + 1 ≤ j ≤ m + n, in order to recompute producing a result, b m+n , at r.
1: for each sender sj that receives REQ; 1 ≤ j ≤ n and n + 1 ≤ k, k ≤ m + n do provides the inputs.
2:
sj broadcasts its input aj, i and R to all parties in Qj.
3:
All parties in Qj calculate at most two right neighboring parties, q k ∈ U k and q k ∈ U k , of indices R[k − n, |U k |] and R[k − n, |U k |] to be added to the right neighboring subquorums, S 2 k and S 2 k .
4:
All parties in Qj send aj, i and R to the parties in S 2 k and the parties in S 2 k . 5: end for 6: for j ← n + 1, . . . , m + n − 1 do recomputes 7:
for all k : j < k ≤ m + n and (Qj, Q k ) ∈ Circuit do 8:
if the new added party, qj ∈ S 2 j , receives all its inputs then 9:
qj performs an operation on its inputs producing an output bj.
10:
qj sends bj, i and R to the parties of S 2 j . 11:
The parties in S 2 j send bj, i, R and the IDs of all parties in S 2 k to party q k .
13:
end if 14:
end for 15: end for 16: All i parties in Sm+n broadcast bm+n, i and R to all parties in Qm+n. 17: All parties in Qm+n send bm+n, i and R to party r. r receives the result.
Algorithm 9 RESEND-RESULT(R, b m+n , i) Party r sends back the result of the computation, b m+n , through a DAG of subquorums, S 3 j 's, to n senders, for n + 1 ≤ j ≤ m + n.
1: r sets RESU LT to be a message consisting of R, bm+n, i and r. 2: r broadcasts RESU LT to all parties of quorum Qm+n. 3: All parties in Qm+n calculate party, qm+n ∈ Um+n, of index R[m, |Um+n|] to be added to S 3 m+n . 4: The parties in Qm+n send RESU LT to the parties of S 3 m+n . 5: for j ← m + n, . . . , n + 2 do forwards result from output quorum to input quorums.
6:
for all k : n + 1 ≤ k < j and (Q k , Qj) ∈ Circuit do 7:
The parties in S 3 j forward RESU LT and the IDs of all parties in S 3 k to party q k . 9:
Party q k sends RESU LT to all the parties in S 3 k . 10: end for 11: end for 12: for k ← n, . . . , 1 do Input quorums forward the result to all senders.
13:
All i parties in the right neighboring subquorums of Q k broadcast RESU LT to all parties in Q k . 14:
All parties in Q k send RESU LT to party s k . 15: end for Algorithm 10 UPDATE Party q ∈ Q calls UPDATE after it claims that it detects a corruption.
1: q broadcasts the fact that it calls UPDATE along with the messages it has received in this call to COMPUTE to all parties in Q . 2: The parties in Q verify that q received inconsistent messages before proceeding. 3: Q notifies all quorums in the circuit via all-to-all communication that UPDATE is called.
4: INVESTIGATE
investigates all participants to determine corruption locations.
5: MARK-IN-CONFLICTS
marks the parties that are in conflict.
Algorithm 11 INVESTIGATE investigates parties to determine corruption locations.
1: for each party, q, involved in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT or CHECK do 2: q compiles all messages they have received (and from whom) and they have sent (and to whom) in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT or CHECK.
3:
q broadcasts these messages to all parties in its quorum and neighboring quorums.
4: end for
CIRCUIT or CHECK broadcast all messages they have received or sent. Then, UPDATE calls MARK-IN-CONFLICTS (Algorithm 12) in order to mark the parties that are in conflict, where a pair of parties is in conflict if at least one of these parties broadcasted messages that conflict with the messages broadcasted by the other party in this pair. Note that each pair of parties that is in conflict has at least one bad party. Recall that if (1/2 − γ)-fraction of parties in any quorum are marked, for any constant γ > 0, e.g., γ = 0.01, they are set unmarked. Also, for each pair of leaders that get marked, their quorums elect another pair of unmarked leaders.
Algorithm 12 MARK-IN-CONFLICTS
1: for each pair of parties, (qx, qy), that is in conflict*, in quorums (Qx, Qy) do 2: party qy broadcasts a conflict message, {qx, qy}, to all parties in Qy.
3:
each party in Qy forwards {qx, qy} to all parties in Qx.
4:
all parties in Qx (or Qy) send {qx, qy} to the other quorums that has qx (or qy).
5:
each quorum has qx or qy sends {qx, qy} to its neighboring quorums. 6: end for 7: for each party q that receives conflict message {qx, qy} do 8:
q marks qx and qy in its marking table. 9: end for 10: if (1/2 − γ)-fraction of parties in any quorum have been marked, for γ = 0.01 then 11:
each of these parties is set unmarked in all its quorums. 12:
each of these parties is set unmarked in all its neighboring quorums. 13: end if 14: for each pair of leaders, (qx, qy), that is in conflict, in quorums (Qx, Qy) do 15:
ELECT(Qx) and ELECT(Qy) to elect a pair of unmarked leaders, (q x , q y ).
16:
Qx and Qy notify their neighboring quorums with (q x , q y ). 17: end for * A pair of parties, (qx, qy), is in conflict if: 1) qx was scheduled to send an output to qy at some point in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT or CHECK; and 2) qy does not receive an expected message from qx in INVESTIGATE, or qy receives a message in INVESTIGATE that is different than the message that it has received from qx in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT or CHECK. the probability of having a subgraph, rooted at some node, having only surviving nodes, of size Ω(
Proof. This proof makes use of the following three propositions, but first we define some notations.
Given an R-DAG, D(V, E), with size n and maximum indegree d, after each node survives independently with probability at most p such that 0 < p ≤ 1 d − , for any constant > 0, we explore D to find a subgraph with only surviving nodes of size more than k, rooted at an arbitrary node v (assuming that node v survives).
Let D (v) be the maximum subgraph of surviving nodes, rooted at node v. Let each node in D have a status, which is either inactive, active or neutral. During the exploration process, the status of nodes is changed. A node x is inactive if x ∈ D (v) and its children are explored determining which one is in D (v). A node x is active if x ∈ D (v) but its children are not explored yet. A node x is neutral if it is neither active nor inactive, i.e., node x and its children are not explored yet.
The exploration process runs in at most k > 0 steps. Initially, we set an arbitrary surviving node, v, active and all other nodes neutral. At each step i, we choose an active node, w i , in an arbitrary way, and we explore all its children. For all (w i , w i ) ∈ E and w i survives and is neutral, we set w i active, otherwise w i remains as it is. Then, we set w i inactive. Note that at any step, if there is no active node, the exploration process terminates. Now let d i be the maximum number of children of node w i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, i.e.,
where deg(w i ) is the degree of node w i and root(D) is the root node of D. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let X i be a non-negative random variable for the number of surviving neutral children of w i , and let Y i be a non-negative random variable for the number of surviving non-neutral children of w i . Note that Y 1 = 0. So X i follows a binomial distribution with parameters
. Let A i be a non-negative random variable for the total number of active nodes after i steps, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Proof. Since the process starts initially with one active node v, A 0 = 1. Now we have two cases of
Case 1 (process terminates before i steps):
where after exploring w i , the total number of active nodes is the number of new active nodes (X i ) due to the exploration of w i in addition to the total number of active nodes of previous steps (A i−1 ) excluding w i that becomes inactive at the end of step i.
Now let |D (v)| be the number of nodes in D (v)
.
To prove this proposition, we first prove that P r(|D (v)| > k) ≤ P r(A k > 0). In order to do that, we prove that |D (v)| > k =⇒ A k > 0. If |D (v)| > k, then the exploration process does not terminate before k steps. This implies that after k steps, there are k inactive nodes and at least one active node remains. This follows that A k > 0. Thus, we have P r(|D (v)| > k) ≤ P r(A k > 0). Now we prove that P r(
By Proposition 1, we obtain that
Proof. To prove this proposition, we first make use of stochastic dominance. For
, and let X + 1 , ..., X + k be independent random variables. We know that Y i ≥ 0 and
We know that S k ∼ Bin(kd, p). Thus, E(S k ) = pdk. Therefore, we have
2+δ pdk .
Now by Propositions 2 and 3, we have
. We know that node v survives with probability at most p. Thus, we obtain
Union bound over n nodes, then the probability that there exists a subgraph of D, rooted at one node, having only surviving nodes of size more than k is at most
Note that npe
(1−pd) 2 log e log(2pn). Thus, the probability of having such a subgraph of size more than 1+pd (1−pd) 2 log e log(2pn), or equivalently, Ω log n (1−pd) 2 , is at most 1/2. Corollary 1. For any R-DAG, of size n, the probability of having a subgraph, rooted at one node, having only surviving nodes, of size at least n/2 is o(1).
Recall that in each round of CHECK, the new added parties are chosen uniformly at random. We define a deception DAG, D i , as a subgraph of the DAG containing the new added parties, that has the following properties: 1) it has only bad parties, of which the adversary makes use to corrupt the computation; 2) it receives all its inputs, and each input is provided correct by at least one good party; and 3) each output it produces is provided to at least one good party, and at least one output is dropped or corrupted.
When the adversary corrupts at least one output of a deception DAG in any round, it has to keep doing such corruption in all subsequent deception DAGs; otherwise, the good parties that expect to receive certain messages from the deception DAG will receive inconsistent messages and so they call UPDATE. Even if the adversary keeps corrupting these outputs from a round to another, the corruption will be detected if the deception DAG shrinks to size zero at any round.
In the following facts, we show that 1) any deception DAG never expands in any direction from a round to another; and 2) it shrinks logarithmically from a round to another with probability at least 1/2. This will imply that any deception DAG shrinks to size zero in O(log * m) rounds with probability at least 1/2. Fact 2 The deception DAG in any round is a supergraph of all subsequent deception DAGs.
Let p be the probability of selecting an unmarked bad party uniformly at random in any quorum. Recall that the fraction of bad parties in any quorum is at most 1/4, and at any time the fraction of unmarked parties in any quorum is at least 1/2 + γ, for any constant γ > 0. Thus, the fraction of unmarked bad parties in any quorum is 1+2γ , for any constant γ > 0. Proof. Given a deception DAG, of size m, that is rooted at one party. By Fact 2, the deception DAG never expands over rounds. Let X i be an indicator random variable, which is 1 if the deception DAG shrinks logarithmically from a round i to round i + 1; and 0 otherwise. Note that in each round, the receiver that is elected by the output quorum is good with probability at least 1/2. By Lemma 1, the probability that the deception DAG shrinks logarithmically is at least 1/2 given that the elected receiver is good. Since the probability of electing a good receiver is independent of the probability that the deception DAG shrinks logarithmically, X i = 1 with probability at least 1/4. Now we show the required number of the X i random variables to be 1 in order to shrink the deception DAG of size m to 0. Now fix p. Due to the constant factor, c ≤
3
(1−pd) 2 , of the logarithmic shrinking in Lemma 2, then after having (log * m − 2) of X i 's equal 1, the deception DAG of size m will shrink to size 2c(log 2c). Moreover, Lemma 2 will not be applicable after the deception DAG shrinks to a constant size, k ≤ c log k. For such case, we simply make use of Corollary 1.
Thus, after having (log * m − 2) of X i 's equal 1, by Corollary 1, we further require at most log(2c(log 2c), of X i 's equal 1 to eventually shrink the deception DAG to size 0. This implies that we require at most 2 log * m of the X i random variables to be 1.
X i . Then E(X) = 4 log * m, and since the X i 's are independent, by Chernoff bounds,
Lemma 2. With probability at least 1/2, any deception DAG, of size m, shrinks to size zero in O(log * m) rounds, where 0 < p ≤ 1/2 1+2γ , for any constant γ > 0. Proof. Let D be a deception DAG with multiple outputs and the adversary corrupts more than one output. Now let D m be the maximum subgraph of D, that is rooted at one party of a corrupted output. Note that by definition any maximal subgraph that is rooted at one party of a corrupted output is a deception DAG. By Fact 2, each of these deception DAGs never expands over rounds. By Fact 3, each of these deception DAGs shrinks to size zero in a number of rounds at most the number of rounds that D m shrinks to size zero. Now we consider the case where the adversary maintains more than one deception DAG in the same round. By Fact 2 and the definition of deception DAG, the deception DAGs of the same round do not overlap, and they shrink independently. Also, by Fact 3, any maximum deception DAG, of one root, shrinks to size zero in a number of rounds that is at least the number of rounds that any other deception DAG, of one root, shrinks to size zero.
Therefore, for the adversary to maximize the expected number of rounds in CHECK is to consider the maximum deception DAG, of one root, in the first round of CHECK. We know that this maximum deception DAG has size at most m. By Fact 3, it shrinks to size zero in O(log * m).
The next lemma shows that CHECK catches corruptions with probability ≥ 1/2.
Lemma 3. Assume some party selected uniformly at random in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT has corrupted a computation. Then when the algorithm CHECK is called, with probability at least 1/2, some party will call UPDATE.
Lemma 4. If some party selected uniformly at random in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT or CHECK has corrupted a computation, then UPDATE will identify a pair of neighboring quorums Q and Q such that at least one pair of parties in these quorums is in conflict and at least one party in such pair is bad.
The next lemma bounds the number of calls to UPDATE before all bad parties are marked.
Lemma 5. UPDATE is called O(t) times before all bad parties are marked.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented algorithms for reliable multiparty computations. These algorithms can significantly reduce message cost and number of computational operations to be asymptotically optimal. The price we pay for this improvement is the possibility of computation corruption. In particular, if there are t ≤ ( 1 4 − )n bad parties, for any constant > 0, our algorithm allows O(t(log * m) 2 ) computations to be corrupted in expectation.
Many problems remain. First, it seems unlikely that the smallest number of corruptions allowable by an attack-resistant algorithm with optimal message complexity is O(t(log * m) 2 ). Can we improve this to O(t) or else prove a non-trivial lower bound? Second, we allow the inputs of parties to reveal. Can we maintain the privacy of these inputs? Third, we assume a partially synchronous communication model, which is crucial for our CHECK algorithm to detect computation corruptions over rounds. Can we extend this algorithm to fit for asynchronous computations?
In UPDATE, we know that each party, q ∈ Q, participated in the last call to COMPUTE broadcasts what it has received and sent to all parties in Q. Thus, all parties of Q verify the correctness of q's computation. Thus, if the corruption occurs due to an incorrect computation made by a bad party, this corruption will be detected and all parties will know that this party is bad. Now if all parties compute correctly and CHECK detects a corruption, then we show that there is some pair of parties will be in conflict. Assume this is not the case. Thus, by the definition of corruption, there must be a deception DAG, in which all inputs are provided correct and an output is corrupted at party q . Then each pair of parties, (q j , q k ) ∈ (Q j , Q k ), in the deception DAG that is rooted at q , is not in conflict, for n + 1 ≤ j < k ≤ m + n. Thus, we have that 1) this DAG received all its inputs correct; 2) all parties compute correctly; and 3) no pair of parties is in conflict. This implies that it must be the case that q received the correct output. But if this is the case, then q that initially called UPDATE would have received no inconsistent messages. This is a contradiction since in such a case, this party would have been unsuccessful in trying to initiate a call to UPDATE. Thus, UPDATE will find two parties that are in conflict, and at least one of them will be bad. Lemma 5. UPDATE is called O(t) times before all bad parties are marked.
Proof. By Lemma 4, if a corruption occurred in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT, and it is caught by CHECK, then UPDATE is called. UPDATE identifies at least one pair of parties that is in conflict, and each of such pairs has at least one bad party. Now let g be the number of marked good parties, and let b be the number of marked bad parties. Also let f (b, g) = b − ( )t, calls to UPDATE, all bad parties are marked. Proof of Theorem 1. We first show the message cost, the number of operations and the latency of our algorithms. By Lemma 5, the number of calling UPDATE is at most O(t). Thus, the resource cost of all calls to UPDATE is bounded as the number of calls to COMPUTE grows large. Therefore, for the amortized cost, we consider only the cost of the calls to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT and CHECK.
When a computation is performed through a circuit of m gates with a circuit depth , COMPUTE-CIRCUIT has message cost O(m+n log n), number of operations O(m+n log n) and latency O( ). CHECK has message cost O((m+n log n)(log * m) 2 ), number of operations O((m+n log n) log * m) and latency O( log * m), but CHECK is called only with probability 1/(log * m) 2 . Hence, the call to CHECK has an amortized expected message cost O(m + n log n), amortized computational operations O( m+n log n log * m ) and an amortized expected latency O( / log * m). In particular, if we call COMPUTE L times, then the expected total number of messages sent will be O(L(m + n log n) + t(m log 2 n)) with expected total number of computational operations O(L(m+n log n)+t(m log n log * m)) and latency O( (L+t)). This is true since UPDATE is called O(t) times and each call to UPDATE has message cost O(m log 2 n) with computational operations O(m log n log * m) and latency O( ). Recall that by Lemma 5, the number of times CHECK must catch corruptions before all bad parties are marked is O(t). In addition, if a bad party caused a corruption during a call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT, then by Lemmas 3 and 4, with probability at least 1/2, CHECK will catch it. As a consequence, it will call UPDATE, which marks the parties that are in conflict. UPDATE is thus called with probability 1/(log * m) 2 , so the expected total number of corruptions is O(t(log * m) 2 ).
